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Economic Partnership Agreements:  
Assessing Potential Implications from Some Alternative Scenarios 
 
Selim Raihan, Mohammad A. Razzaque and Edwin Laurent 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 and the 
decolonisation process, the European Union (EU), and the group of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries have established a privileged relationship among themselves. 
Under the Yaoundé agreements (1963-1969; and 1969-1975), and four successive Lomé 
Conventions (1975-2000), such a relationship has been further fostered. Under these 
agreements, the EU has granted, on a non-reciprocal basis, a preferential market access to 
ACP imports (almost free market access on most of the imports into EU from ACP 
countries). This has also been accompanied by a substantial development (aid) component. In 
2000, with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement – the successor to Lomé IV Convention – 
the ACP countries (six ACP regions: Central Africa, East and Southern Africa, Southern 
Africa, West Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) and the EU agreed to enter into a new 
phase of negotiations, namely economic partnership agreements (EPAs). EPAs are envisaged 
to establish free trade agreements (FTAs) between the EU and ACP regions. EPA 
negotiations started in September 2002 and should come into force by 1 January, 2008. One 
of the major objectives of the EPAs is to harmonize the trade integration process of the region 
with replacing the non-reciprocity rules of the Lomé Agreement by reciprocal arrangements 
in compliance with the WTO rules.  
 
Concerns have, however, been expressed whether EPA would be beneficial for the ACP 
countries on grounds of several reasons. Firstly, since the ACP countries were already 
enjoying trade preferences to the EU, reciprocal arrangements under the EPA could imply 
surges in EU exports into the region triggering adjustment costs for a range of local 
industries. Many ACP members are also critically dependent on trade taxes for government 
revenues. Since ‘reciprocity’ is intended to be a  feature of an EPA, requiring ACP countries 
to remove their tariffs on ‘substantially all’ imports from the EU, the new arrangement could 
result in considerable loss in government revenues in the absence of any new fiscal measure 
thereby jeopardizing the provisioning some critical public services.  
 
Secondly, an important issue in the on-going EPA negotiations is the need for addressing the 
concerns of the least developed countries (LDCs). There are concerns that EPA outcomes 
would reduce the current preferences enjoyed by these countries on the one hand, and result 
in their reciprocating with trade preferences to EU suppliers on the other. At present under 
the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement all LDCs are eligible to duty-free quota-free 
market access to EU market without needing them to reciprocate. Therefore, if, under the 
EPA, the participating countries are required to reciprocate, in terms of market access, LDCs 
will likely to be better-off with the existing mechanism of EBA, since Commission 
negotiators have not confirmed that the EPA will provide at least the benefits of EBA. That is 
why some suggest that additional benefits must be provided to make EPAs attractive to 
LDCs. The issue of additional incentives is often linked to the demand for introducing the 
development dimensions into the EPAs, which would be beneficial to LDC and non-LDC 
participating members. 
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Furthermore, there are concerns about the impact of EPA on the currently existing regional 
integration schemes, particularly in Africa. Both parties negotiating EPAs – the EU and the 
ACP – appear to agree that regional integration in ACP is desirable. Currently, the ACP 
countries give a lot of emphasis on their regional schemes as these are sometimes viewed as 
‘stepping stones’ towards a successful global integration process. The negotiating 
arrangements and views subscribed by the EU negotiators seem to suggest that EPA 
outcomes are being foreseen as beneficial to internal trade amongst the African countries 
within the regional trading blocs. However, there are concerns about EPA’s impact on 
regional trade.     
 
In the above backdrop, the present study assesses economic impacts of the trade liberalisation 
aspects of the proposed EPAs between the EU and ACP countries. While a number of issues 
make the task of impact assessment of any kind of partnership arrangement very complicated, 
a quantitative assessment of the likely implications of EPAs establishing FTAs between the 
EU and the ACP countries would be very useful. In this context, the present study, using a 
global database and a global general equilibrium modelling technique, explores the possible 
outcomes of different scenarios of EPAs, and analyses relevant policy implications of the 
EPA negotiations.   
 
II. Empirical Studies on EPA 
 
Reduced government tariff revenue is one of the significant concerns of the developing and 
less developed countries of Africa. COMESA (2002) concluded that the costs of EPAs would 
be in terms of loss of revenue to government and the associated adjustment costs of 
developing alternative sources of government revenue. The broad finding was that if all the 
EU imports came in free of duty, on the basis of trade statistics for 2000, the governments in 
the COMESA region would lose about a quarter (25 percent) of their trade taxes and about 
six percent of their total tax revenue. The COMESA study notes that while a loss of a 
maximum of six percent of tax revenue may not seem to be a huge amount of money to make 
up over an extended period, the precarious situation in which most of the fiscal systems in 
COMESA countries are would present major adjustment difficulties. Reforming the tax 
administrations in the COMESA countries with a view to establishing elastic and buoyant tax 
systems would have considerable adjustment costs for these countries. 
 
Tekere and Ndlela (2003) in addressing the EPAs question for SADC examined the trade 
aspects of the Cotonou Agreement for the Southern African countries. Based on a partial 
equilibrium modelling framework, the study showed that EPAs would result in significant 
reduction in revenues for the Southern African Developing Countries. Due to the significant 
imports from the EU, all the countries under consideration would experience revenue 
shortfalls immediately with the process of tariffs dismantlement under the reciprocation 
process. In this process, Tanzania is estimated to experience at least 37 percent decline in 
tariff revenues, while that for Namibia is 24 percent.  
 
EUROSTEP (2004) provides some estimates based on five case studies. Three of the 
countries are African: Cameroon, Benin and Ghana. The study estimated that between 20-30 
percent of the Cameroonian government revenue would be lost following a reciprocal free 
trade with the EU. Also, would result in accumulated job losses, tax shortfalls and lower 
growth rates. Ghana on the other part would experience 20 percent reduction in cocoa exports 
revenues, considering the fact that cocoa is the largest export to the EU from Ghana making 
up to 37 percent of Ghanaian exports. In addition, this study estimated that only 25 percent of 
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Ghanaian industries would survive without tariff protection following implementation of free 
trade with the EU. 
 
Busse et al. (2004) studied the potential impacts of EPAs on ECOWAS countries with a 
partial equilibrium methodology focused on the trade and budget effects. The study examined 
the implications of the complete elimination of tariff barriers for EU goods in ECOWAS 
countries. The direct effect of the shock would result in a decline in import duties ranging 
from as high as US$487.8 million in Nigeria to US$2.2 million in Guinea-Bissau. Countries 
with similar conditions were supposed to experience increased budget deficit assuming 
constant government expenditure and the magnitude is estimated to be as high as 4.1 and 3.5 
percent of GDP respectively. Moreover, the study established that a few light manufacturing 
product categories including apparel and clothing, footwear, sugar and related products, 
cereals and cereal products were sensitive in almost all ECOWAS countries with respect to 
import flows.  
 
A more analytical study rather than empirical, by Meyn (2004) focuses on Botswana, 
Mauritius and Mozambique and presents arguments in favour of regional integration within 
ACP countries compared to EU-ACP partnerships under EPA. The study envisaged that the 
later would result in more trade diversion than trade creation and the ACP countries will 
experience deindustrialization if regional integration among them was not fostered. Another 
study on African countries came out with completely opposite results that trade creation 
effects will be far more than trade diversion effects in majority of the countries that are able 
to access cheaper imports of both intermediate and final products from EU (UNECA, 2005). 
Cheaper imports have their direct impact on consumer welfare that ultimately results in 
overall welfare improvement. However, deindustrialization and thereby factory closures may 
not be welcomed by the consumers and can wipe out the welfare improvements. 
Additionally, though study findings of most of the partial equilibrium analysis reveals that 
trade creation implications will be higher than trade diversion effects of EPA and EPA will 
therefore be welfare enhancing, in most of the cases the welfare gain is not compared with 
the loss in producer surplus and government revenue shortfalls (Busse et al. 2004).  
 
Milner (2005) identified four broad categories of adjustment assistance support costs, 
namely: fiscal adjustment costs, trade facilitation and export development costs, production 
and employment adjustment costs and skill development and productivity enhancement costs. 
His estimates showed that the overall cost of adjustment assistance for the ACP (at 2005 
equivalent prices) to be €9.1 billion, with a breakdown of €3.3 billion for fiscal adjustment 
support, €2.1 billion for trade facilitation/export development support, €1.5 billion for 
production and employment adjustment assistance, and €2.3 billion for skills and productivity 
enhancement support. He further pointed out that the fiscal adjustment costs were 
predominantly related to legislative and administrative reforms in the public sector (tax 
administration reforms and development), while the other categories would involve a mixture 
of disbursement to the public and private sectors in the ACP. 
 
III. Methodology applied in the Present Study 
 
Most of the studies on EPA have been descriptive in nature. While these studies gather data 
growth. Studies based on descriptive approaches do collect and analyse a large body of 
information about the nature of trade flows and policy regimes from which qualitative 
assessments are made about the consequences of policy changes. However, the main 
disadvantage of this approach is its inability to test a theoretical model to validate the claims 
 4
made empirically. To overcome the problem of descriptive studies, a number of attempts have 
been made to conduct empirical assessments of potential implications arising from possible 
negotiation outcomes. These studies are particularly appealing to the policy makers and trade 
negotiators as they aim to provide ex ante impact analyses. Empirical studies however require 
suitable data – most often on a wide variety of activities and sector – that are not available for 
a large number of ACP countries. In the case of the availability of limited data, some 
compromise with regard to the choice of empirical methodologies becomes inevitable.  
 
Most of the aforementioned studies have been based on partial equilibrium models and 
therefore, provide a partial perspective on these effects due to methodological limitations. 
These studies fail to provide important insights regarding the impact of the EPAs on trade (at 
the individual country level and regional and world levels), GDP, terms-of-trade, 
employment, and welfare.  
 
As an exception to this, the study by UNECA (2005) used both general equilibrium and 
partial equilibrium analysis and found that for overall welfare enhancement of the ACP 
region EPA should concentrate more on regional integration within the ACP countries than 
free trade areas with EU. This study also suggests that EPA, to have development concerns, 
needs to consider appropriate measures to tackle macroeconomic imbalances that may arise 
from the revenue shortfall impacts. Perez (2006) also applied a general equilibrium method to 
explore different EPA scenarios. The studies by UNECA (2005) and Perez (2006) provide 
some very useful insights about the possible impacts of different EPA scenarios. However, 
there are few problems with these two studies. Firstly, UNECA (2005) used the version 5 of 
the GTAP database which has 1997 as the base year. It appears that both the structure of the 
economy and the level of protection of the ACP countries have undergone significant 
changes since 1997. Therefore, any meaningful analysis of EPA should be based on an 
updated database. Secondly, though Perez (2006) used a more updated database (version 6 of 
GTAP), the study did not provide any impact analysis of EPA for the disaggregated ACP 
countries. In his analysis, all the ACP countries are divided into five groups: SSA, Rest of 
SADC, South Africa, ACPPacific and ACPCARICOM. However, there is a need to examine 
the impact of EPA at the individual ACP country level as much as possible. Because, the 
welfare effects of EPA are likely to differ across ACP countries, and this may have different 
implications for the ACP LDCs and the ACP non-LDCs. The very recent GTAP database 
(version 6.22) helps to do such an analysis for 14 ACP African countries/regions of which 7 
are LDCs.  
 
The present study applies the general equilibrium approach in order to examine the possible 
effects of EPA on the economies of ACP countries. A global computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) modelling framework, namely the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), is the best possible 
way for the ex ante analysis of the economic and trade consequences of comprehensive 
multilateral or bilateral trade agreements. Annex 1 demonstrates some of the basic 
characteristics of the GTAP model.  
 
This study uses the version 6.22 of the GTAP database which has updated national, economic 
and trade data, and more importantly protection data from a new source.1 The new GTAP 
database has lower tariffs than the earlier versions as a result of the reform efforts in the 
recent years, which includes, for example, China’s progress towards WTO accession and 
                                                 
1 The source of the new protection data is the MAcMaps, a product of the joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC(Geneva) 
project, which has a detailed database on bilateral tariff protection that integrates trade preferences, specific 
tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
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continued implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement, and the inclusion of bilateral 
trade preferences. The GTAP database has been further adjusted to incorporate the phasing 
out of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2005, the enlargement of the EU to 27 members 
and the removal of export subsidies in agriculture. It was agreed in the Hong Kong 
Ministerial that the export subsidies on agriculture would be eliminated by 2013. Since full 
implementation of EPA will take place by 2018, such adjustments are done in the benchmark 
database. 
 
Data on regions and commodities are aggregated to meet the objectives of this study. The 
version 6.22 of GTAP database covers 57 commodities, 96 regions/countries, and 5 factors of 
production. The current study has aggregated 57 commodities into 15, and 96 regions into 19 
as shown in table 1 and 2 below. In the GTAP database, each industry produces one 
commodity. So, there is a one to one relation between industries and commodities.     
 
             
Table 1: Commodity Aggregation in the GTAP model 
Constructed broad 
sectors 
Commodities included 
Cereal Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec. 
Vegetables Vegetables, fruit, nuts. 
Oil seeds Oil seeds. 
Sugar Sugar cane, sugar beet. 
Cotton Plant-based fibers. 
Other crops Crops nec. 
Livestock Cattle, sheep, goats, horses; Animal products nec; Raw milk; Wool, silk-worm cocoons. 
Natural resources Forestry; Fishing; Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec. 
Agro processing Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse; Meat products nec; Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy 
products; Processed rice; Sugar; Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco products. 
Textile Textiles. 
Wearing apparels Wearing apparel. 
Light manufacturing Leather products; Wood products; Paper products, publishing. 
Industry Petroleum, coal products; Chemical, rubber, plastic prods; Mineral products nec; 
Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Metal products; Motor vehicles and parts; Transport 
equipment nec; Electronic equipment; Machinery and equipment nec; Manufactures nec. 
Services Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution; Water; Construction; Communication; 
Financial services nec; Insurance; Business services nec; Recreation and other services; 
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat; Dwellings. 
Trade Trade; Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regional aggregation in the GTAP Model 
Aggregated 
regions 
Comprising countries/regions 
EU 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
Malawi Malawi 
Mozambique Mozambique 
Tanzania Tanzania 
Uganda Uganda 
Zambia Zambia 
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Madagascar Madagascar 
Senegal Senegal 
South Africa  South Africa and the rest of South African Customs Union and the rest of Southern African 
Development Community 
Botswana Botswana 
Mauritius Mauritius 
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
Nigeria Nigeria 
Rest of SSA Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Caribbean Rest of the Caribbean 
Pacific Rest of Oceania 
All other regions 
 
Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Rest of East Asia, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Rest of Southeast 
Asia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Canada, United States of 
America, Mexico, Rest of North America, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Rest of South America, Central America, Rest of 
Free Trade Area of Americas , Switzerland, the rest of EFTA, the rest of Europe, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Russian Federation, the rest of the Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran, the rest of the 
Middle East, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Rest of North Africa. 
 
 
IV. ACP Economies: Structure of Production, Trade and Protection   
 
Production and protection structures of an economy are principal determinants of potential 
outcomes arising from changes in the trade-related conditions, including unilateral 
liberalisation, regional integration and shifts in global trading circumstances such as price 
shocks. Therefore, understanding these structures will be a very important starting point for 
the examination of the potential implications of EPA for the ACP countries. It also needs to 
be pointed out that the empirical outcomes will be conditional upon the data used in the 
exercise, and as such the derived results will have to be evaluated against the information 
available at the time of the construction of the database. There is often a lag between the 
prevailing situation and the data period, emanating mainly from the time required updating 
the database to reflect the changes in the trade policy regimes of different countries. 
Consequently, the interpretation of results should be provided with some caution. For the 
present paper, the GTAP database is used and the following provides a snapshot of the base 
production, protection and trade situations of various country and country groups.    
 
4.1. Structure of Production  
 
Figure 1 exhibits the structure of production in ACP countries. Amongst the African 
countries while agriculture constitutes more than 40 percent of GDP in Malawi, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Madagascar, Nigeria and rest of Southern Africa, for Botswana the dependence on 
the sector is the lowest, with only 16 percent of its GDP coming from the sector. The 
Caribbean and the Pacific countries have also low shares of agriculture in GDP. According to 
the data, apart from Madagascar, ACP countries have high shares of services in GDP. On the 
other hand, the contribution of manufacturing sector in the economy is generally low for the 
ACP countries, with Uganda having the lowest figure of 4 percent. Only in three countries, 
viz., Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, manufacturing activities comprise 30 percent or 
more of the national output. For the Caribbean region as a whole manufacturing contributed 
to 20 percent of GDP while for the Pacific countries the comparable figure is only about 10 
percent.  
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Figure 1: Production Structure in ACP Countries 
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4.2. Structure of Exports and Imports 
 
Figure 2 portrays the structure ACP exports. For Malawai, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, 
the dependence on agriculture and agro-processing for export earning is excessively high, 
with the corresponding shares being 76, 57, 49 and 41 percent, respectively. In Madagascar 
and Senegal, more than one-third of the export-receipts is due to this sector alone. Amongst 
the ACP countries, Botswana has the highest of manufacturing in total exports (87 percent), 
followed by Zambia (78 percent), South Africa (67 percent), and Madagascar (53 percent). 
However, ACP countries in general and for such countries/region as Zambia, Madagascar, 
and the Caribbean in particular, the small size of the merchandise export volume hardly 
makes the manufacturing share in total exports anything significant. 
 
Figure 2: Export Structures in ACP Countries 
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Figure 3: ACP Import Structures 
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The structure of imports into the ACP countries is captured in Figure 3. As expected, 
manufacturing is the most dominant imports in all ACP countries. Like in many developing 
countries in other parts of the world, imports of machineries and industrial raw materials are 
very important for economic development in the ACP region. For Malawi, Zambia, South 
Africa, Botswana, Nigeria, other Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, the 
manufacturing imports, considering both light and heaving manufacturing taken together, 
account for more than 70 percent of total merchandise imports.  
  
4.3 Structure of Protection 
 
Table 1 shows the average applied tariffs on goods imported into ACP countries from the EU, 
as shown in the GTAP database. It is found that the existing ACP tariffs on a wide range of 
imports from EU are quite high. Particularly, imports of agro-processed goods, textile, 
wearing apparels and light manufactures are subject to moderate to high tariffs in most 
countries. These import tariffs can be seen as part of the industrial policy in these countries.  
 
Table 1: Ad Valorem Tariff Rates (%) on EU Imports into ACP Countries 
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Cereal  0.0 2.3 20.0 2.6 5.0 0.2 5.0 16.1 0.0 0.0 15.0 5.0 6.3 0.6 0.0 
Vegetables  0.0 21.9 14.1 14.6 14.0 8.7 19.5 6.7 0.0 4.3 16.3 77.0 21.2 19.4 0.9 
Oil seeds  0.0 0.0 24.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 5.0 19.6 10.7 9.5 0.0 
Sugar  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.4 0.0 0.0 
Cotton  10.0 2.3 3.8 0.0 14.6 0.0 5.0 12.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 7.3 0.0 0.0 
Other crops  13.4 2.8 4.9 9.2 9.6 5.5 5.6 3.7 0.7 11.5 21.2 23.2 9.0 8.7 27.2 
Livestock  8.9 0.0 19.0 6.7 6.7 1.6 9.3 0.5 0.6 6.0 7.3 24.1 13.1 11.4 0.0 
Natural resources  4.1 5.2 5.4 4.1 4.3 0.1 5.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 4.4 13.4 7.0 5.8 0.2 
Agro processing  13.6 17.5 22.1 13.0 16.2 4.2 13.2 14.5 6.3 20.2 41.5 35.9 19.0 20.5 35.0 
Textile  20.9 17.1 20.1 12.3 17.6 6.0 19.0 14.0 17.1 2.4 16.8 40.1 19.7 5.7 15.2 
Wearing apparels 23.6 24.0 20.5 13.8 24.5 16.3 20.0 37.4 26.4 72.3 55.4 52.1 27.5 21.1 14.1 
Light manufacturing   3.8 15.6 14.8 8.1 14.2 4.2 11.7 7.6 4.9 30.4 12.8 24.6 17.9 11.4 10.4 
Industry  9.9 8.6 12.7 4.7 7.8 4.1 9.2 6.7 7.9 18.3 13.8 19.6 11.7 9.1 11.6 
Services  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Figure 4: Average Tariffs on Imports from the EU 
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Figure 4 provides the average tariffs on EU imports from individual ACP countries/regions, 
where it found that the simple average duty rate varies from as low as 4 percent in 
Madagascar to as high as 27 percent in Nigeria. Tanzania, Zambia, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, rest 
of Southern Africa, and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa also have average tariffs of more than 
10 percent. The comparable average tariffs for the Caribbean and the Pacific are 9.5 percent 
and 8.8 percent, respectively.   
 
Table 2: Ad Valorem Tariff Rates (%) on Imports from ACP into EU 
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Cereal  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.0 1.5 2.4 0.0 
Vegetables  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 10.6 1.4 4.2 4.0 1.6 13.6 30.5 4.8 
Oil seeds  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sugar  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 2.3 17.1 0.0 
Cotton  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other crops  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Livestock  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 
Nat resources  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Agro processing  91.6 0.3 4.7 0.0 85.4 1.2 0.0 31.8 71.7 77.4 96.5 0.1 2.0 44.4 77.4 
Textile  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 
Wearing apparels 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Light manufacturing   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Industry  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Services  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Madagascar and Senegal are the LDCs.  
 
The average applied tariff rates on imports from the ACP countries into the EU are given in 
Table 2. It is confirmed that for the ACP LDCs the EU provides duty-free access in almost all 
product categories. The EU also grants either zero or low tariff access for most of product 
categories originating in non-LDC ACP countries as well. The only major exception to the 
very favourable market access granted is the EU imports of agro-processing products that are 
faced with excessively high tariffs in general. It then follows that as the ACP countries are 
already receiving either zero or very low tariffs in most sectors, major expansions of ACP 
exports to the EU in the aftermath of an EPA-FTA will likely to be concentrated in a few 
sectors. On the other hand, it also becomes obvious that cessation of the preferences granted 
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so far could lead to substantial rise in EU tariffs in most sectors, particularly for non-LDC 
ACP members.2     
 
Table 3 contains information on average tariffs on intra-African trade by individual countries 
and regions, which might be useful in understanding the possible trade displacement effects 
of EPA. However, compared to the tariff rates faced by the ACP countries in EU the intra-
ACP tariff rates are pretty high for many of the product categories. Since under EPA, in 
addition to the question of reciprocity to EU, some of these intra-African tariffs will have to 
be eliminated amongst members within a trading group, this may accentuate concerns 
regarding de-industrialisation and revenue shortfalls in majority of the countries. Table 4 
presents figures on average commodity tariffs in the ACP countries. It appears that most of 
the tariff protections with respect to intra-African trade is on agro-processing, textile, wearing 
apparels and light manufactures. It can be anticipated that in the absence of reciprocity with 
the EU, there is a potential for trade creation in the ACP trade if these tariff barriers were to 
be eliminated. However, with reciprocity, trade creation for most efficient African producers 
is not likely to be maximised because of the competitive advantage of the EU producers.  
 
Table 3: Average Ad Valorem Tariffs on Intra-ACP Trade (%) 
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Malawi  0.0 5.9 10.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 9.2 8.5 0.0 0.0 10.4 3.1 1.9 1.1 
Mozambique  5.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.2 9.3 9.8 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 
Tanzania  7.8 6.4 0.0 7.5 10.7 1.1 0.6 3.6 3.5 2.5 13.5 0.6 13.2 5.3 0.0 
Uganda  0.7 1.4 10.5 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.9 6.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 2.6 4.1 5.1 4.0 
Zambia  0.0 2.0 13.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.6 5.6 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.6 0.0 0.2 
Madagascar 0.0 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.3 0.0 
Senegal 3.3 0.9 5.2 0.5 1.5 0.6 0.0 5.8 0.0 1.0 1.0 7.6 7.1 0.3 0.0 
S. Africa & 8.1 9.6 13.6 7.7 10.0 3.6 6.7 0.0 0.0 5.8 19.0 23.4 14.3 9.6 5.7 
Botswana  5.9 0.3 3.8 0.9 11.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 12.7 0.7 2.9 0.8 0.0 
Mauritius  0.0 3.8 4.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.8 5.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 7.2 0.6 3.3 0.0 
Zimbabwe  0.0 6.1 13.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.8 8.1 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.4 12.0 0.0 
Rest of Soutn Afri 0.7 6.5 3.7 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.3 3.4 0.0 3.8 3.0 0.0 7.4 0.9 0.0 
Nigeria 7.1 1.1 5.4 3.1 4.7 0.0 5.7 4.3 3.6 6.2 6.7 0.0 12.2 2.9 0.0 
Rest of SSA 0.3 2.4 15.4 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 6.7 6.6 0.8 0.8 31.7 6.4 7.0 1.0 
Caribbean  1.5 2.0 4.3 0.9 8.6 0.1 3.4 4.9 0.0 4.2 4.0 2.8 13.1 0.4 14.0 
Pacific 1.9 0.6 5.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 5.9 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 8.8 6.1 15.5 
 
 
Table 4: Average Commodity Tariffs in ACP Countries (%) 
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Cereal 0.0 1.2 7.2 1.2 2.1 0. 0.8 3.7 2.3 0.0 1.8 2.5 7.0 0.4 0.7 
Vegetables 3.0 4.5 6.3 3.1 5.4 0. 4.0 2.5 1.9 1.7 5.9 15.5 12.8 8.9 6.7 
Oil seeds 0.0 0.7 9.2 1.5 2.7 0. 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.6 5.4 1.8 0.5 
Sugar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.4 0.0 
Cotton 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.6 2.1 0. 0.5 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 2.2 0.0 0.0 
Other crops 5.5 2.5 3.6 1.9 5.0 0. 4.4 5.6 4.3 6.1 10.1 6.7 8.5 8.5 7.9 
Livestock 1.5 0.9 9.7 2.1 2.3 0. 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 2.8 5.7 6.3 1.6 2.4 
Nat resources 0.4 0.9 3.5 1.0 1.1 0. 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 1.7 2.8 6.6 1.0 0.1 
                                                 
2 Under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, the EU has already been duty-free and quota-free market 
access to a virtually all products originated in LDCs with the exception of a few agricultural goods. Therefore, 
even in the absence of EPAs, ACP LDCs can take advantage of the EBA arrangement. 
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Agro processing 5.9 6.2 14. 4.0 6.5 1. 3.5 11.3 14.1 9.1 10.5 16.1 12.9 14.9 9.3 
Textile 6.8 7.7 12. 3.6 6.2 1. 7.5 16.0 9.5 4.7 9.8 14.3 13.5 2.8 6.3 
Wearing apparels 8.8 12.7 15. 4.2 10. 3. 4.3 31.8 13.8 11.2 20.2 13.9 19.1 11.8 7.2 
Light manufacturing 7.6 7.5 12. 3.9 10. 1. 4.3 6.3 2.0 7.5 8.2 11.8 13.4 5.9 6.0 
Industry 7.4 8.0 12. 4.3 5.4 1. 6.6 3.2 2.5 10.8 7.1 14.9 9.4 8.6 2.6 
Services 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
4.4 Sources of Imports and the Possibility of Trade Diversion 
 
The welfare effects of any RTA are analysed using two concepts: trade creation and trade 
diversion (see Box 1). The effect of the protectionist element of integration is called trade 
diversion, while the outcome of the true liberalisation element is considered as trade creation. 
The net welfare effects of economic integration are ambiguous and require case-by-case 
assessments. The reason is that integration is both a policy of protection and a move toward 
free trade. If trade creation dominates, the formation of an RTA will enhance welfare. Note 
that, if member countries are the low-cost producers (relative to the rest of the world 
suppliers) of the traded goods, there will be no trade diversion and integration will 
unambiguously increase welfare. To examine the possibility of trade creation and trade 
diversion effects of EPA it is necessary to have a look at the base year sources of imports for 
the ACP countries. 
Box.1: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
 Country A Country B Country C 
Supply price 50 40 30 
Case – Alpha: If A imposes a tariff of 100% on both B and C, only A’s own producers will supply in its 
domestic market. 
Case – Beta: If A imposes a tariff of 50% on both B and C, only C will be the supplying country in A’s 
market. 
Case – Gamma: If A forms customs union with B by eliminating all tariffs on imports from B, but retains 
the 50% duty on C. B will be the supplying country in A. 
 
If Alpha was the initial condition, moving to Gamma will be considered as trade creation, enhancing 
welfare for A. On the other hand, if Beta was the initial condition, moving to Gamma is an example of 
trade diversion with adverse consequences on welfare of A. 
 
Figure 5: Sources of Imports 
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Figure 5 presents the sources of imports for the ACP countries. It appears that for each of the 
country/country groups the EU is an important source of imports, with Senegal sourcing a 
highest of 49 percent of its imports from the EU alone. Figure 5 clearly shows that the critical 
significance of the rest of the world (RoW) and the ACP region including South Africa as the 
sources of imports for most of the ACP countries. It would, therefore, be important to know 
whether and, if yes, to what extent EPA will lead to the changes in the sources of imports for 
the ACP countries. If, taking advantage of the reciprocity, EU exporters manage to replace 
the imports from the initially low-cost suppliers, trade diversion will take place.  
 
V. Simulation Design and Results 
 
To fulfil the study objectives, this paper explores the impacts of the four scenarios, as listed 
in Table 5. The first simulation experiment looks into the effects of a textbook-type free trade 
area in which the partner countries eliminate all tariffs involving trade amongst them. The 
next two scenarios attempt to analyse the potential implications arising out of the less-than-
full reciprocity principle, thereby allowing ACP countries some flexibility as against of 
complete elimination of tariffs on imports from the EU. This could also be not entirely 
inconsistent given the ambiguities associated with the GATT Article XXIV calling RTA 
member countries to exchange preferences involving ‘substantially all trade’. Simulation 3 
therefore seeks to find out what happens when ACP countries eliminate their tariffs by 75 
percent and in Simulation 4 by 50 percent as against of complete elimination of all EU tariffs 
on imports from ACP countries in both cases. If EPA negotiations fail, the worst situation for 
the ACP states would be to access EU market under existing preferential schemes such as the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or Everything but Arms (EBA), which are 
unilateral but reversible concessions by the EU. Since the more generous EBA preferences 
are meant for the LDCs, ACP LDCs will opt for the EBA scheme in the absence of a 
successful EPA outcome, while ACP non-LDC member will be considered for GSP 
preferences. Simulation 4 depicts this particular situation in the event of unsuccessful EPA 
negotiations.  
 
Table 5: Simulations 
Simulation Design Explanation 
Simulation 1 The formation of an FTA between the EU and ACP countries in which all tariffs on the 
EU-ACP trade are eliminated. 
Simulation 2 ACP countries eliminate their tariff by 75 percent on all imports from the EU, while the 
EU grants 100 percent duty-free access to ACP products to its market. 
Simulation 3 This is similar to scenario 2, except that ACP countries now reciprocate tariff 
elimination by only 50 percent on all imports from the EU. 
Simulation 4 GSP Option – the ACP countries leave their tariffs unchanged, while the EU increases 
its tariffs on imports from the ACP non-LDC countries to the level of the GSP. 
 
 
VI. Results of the Simulation Exercises 
6.1. Simulation 1: FTA between EU and ACP Countries: Complete Elimination of 
Tariffs 
 
The aggregate welfare effects of an FTA between EU and ACP countries based on complete 
elimination of tariffs and full reciprocity are given in Figure 6.3 Complete elimination of EU-
                                                 
3 The welfare effects are measured by the equivalent variation (EV). It is measured by the difference between 
the expenditure required to obtain the new level of utility (resulting from a shock) at initial prices and the 
expenditure to be incurred for the same level of utility before the shock. Thus, the EV uses the current prices as 
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ACP tariffs leads huge welfare gains (US$ 2.3 billion) for the EU. These gains are driven 
primarily by the allocative efficiency as well as by the favourable terms of trade. The 
allocative efficiency gains are to be attributable to reallocation of resources away from 
relatively inefficient sectors to the more efficient ones, triggered by tariff liberalisation 
measures. On the other hand, the favourable terms of trade effects generated by tariff 
concessions received in the ACP market vis-à-vis all other suppliers.      
 
Figure 6: Aggregate Welfare Gains the FTA Based on Complete Elimination of Tariffs and Full 
Reciprocity  
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Table 5: Impact on Welfare: Full FTA between EU and ACP countries (Million US$) 
 Decomposition of welfare Total 
welfare Allocative 
efficiency 
TOT  
effect 
Investment- 
Savings effect 
EU 1755.3 533.8 36.4 2325.5 
Malawi  1.5 -9.4 2.2 -5.7 
Mozambique  3.6 -11.4 -1.0 -8.8 
Tanzania  -4.9 -7.8 -23.0 -35.7 
Uganda  -2.4 2.9 -2.2 -1.7 
Zambia  -6.1 1.6 2.0 -2.5 
Madagascar 1.1 -11.2 -1.8 -11.9 
Senegal 3.1 -16.3 -41.2 -54.5 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 189.0 703.1 -28.2 863.9 
Botswana  16.7 66.4 -14.8 68.4 
Mauritius  56.5 506.2 1.2 563.9 
Zimbabwe  24.7 231.9 -1.8 254.7 
Nigeria -410.7 -118.1 67.3 -461.5 
Rest of SSA -166.6 -327.4 -327.8 -821.8 
Caribbean  -34.1 -0.9 -12.4 -47.4 
Pacific -20.2 -51.6 -8.1 -79.9 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
                                                                                                                                                        
the base and asks what income change at the current prices would be equivalent to the resultant changes in terms 
of its impact on utility. 
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The impacts on the ACP countries are rather mixed, although all the 7 ACP LDCs stand to 
lose with Tanzania enduring the largest welfare loss (US$ -35.7 million). The largest gain of 
US$864 million occurs to South Africa (including the rest of South African Customs Union) 
followed by Mauritius (US$564 million), Zimbabwe (US$ 254 million), and Botswana (US$ 
68.4 million). The positive gains of South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana and Zimbabwe are 
dominated by favourable terms of trade effects. Previously it was highlighted that EU tariffs 
on agro-processing products were very high in most cases and the removal of these tariffs 
would induce enhanced export response from these countries to the EU. Our results show that 
the exports of agro-processing products from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and 
Botswana increase by respectively, US$1,858 million, US$868 million, US$853 million and 
US$515 million. 
 
On the other hand, a number of other SSA countries experience welfare loss. The largest loss 
is for the rest of SSA followed by Nigeria. For Nigeria the loss in allocative efficiency turns 
out to be the major cause of welfare loss. Nigeria’s such a high loss in allocative efficiency is 
largely due to the loss in import revenue. After FTA, imports into Nigeria from EU increases 
by large margin, while from all other regions decline (see box 2). The decline in the imports 
from the rest of the world (which are subject to high tariffs) causes large loss in import 
revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The welfare loss of Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is dominated both by investment-savings 
effect and the negative terms of trade effect. As, the Rest of SSA countries are the net 
receivers  of investment from abroad, these countries, following a negative shock, will loose 
from a rise in the prices of investment goods, relative to those of domestic savings goods.   
 
Box 2: Change in Imports into Nigeria from all regions due to FTA (Million US$) 
 
EU 4208.70 
Malawi  -0.18 
Mozambique  -0.06 
Tanzania  -0.23 
Uganda  -0.29 
Zambia  -0.03 
Madagascar -0.01 
Senegal -2.58 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs -129.83 
Botswana  -0.81 
Mauritius  -1.20 
Zimbabwe  -1.44 
Rest of Southern Africa 0.03 
Nigeria 0.00 
Rest of SSA -36.28 
Caribbean  -2.55 
Pacific -1.71 
ROW -2908.24 
Total 1123.30 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results. 
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Both the Pacific and Caribbean regions experience welfare loss. Welfare loss of the 
Caribbean region is mainly driven by the loss in allocative efficiency, while that of the 
Pacific region is dominated by the loss due to unfavourable terms of trade effect.   
 
The macroeconomic impacts of the FTA between the EU and the ACP countries are depicted 
in Table 6. It is observed that FTA would have small and mixed effects on real GDP of the 
ACP countries. Uganda, Madagascar, Rest of SSA and Caribbean do not experience any 
change in their real GDP. Rest of Southern Africa experience a rise by 1 percent and Nigeria 
encounters a fall by 0.7 percent. All other African ACP countries/regions have GDP changes, 
whether positive or negative, between 0.1 and 0.3 percent. The GDP of the Pacific region 
increases by 0.5 percent.   
 
Table 6: Macroeconomic Impact: FTA between EU and ACP countries (Scenario 1) 
 Real GDP 
(% change 
from 
the 
base run) 
 
Import 
(% change 
from 
the base 
run) 
 
Export 
(% change 
from 
the base 
run) 
 
TOT 
(% change 
from 
the base 
run) 
 
BOT 
(Million 
US$) 
Malawi  -0.1 9.5 4.7 -0.8 -143.1 
Mozambique  -0.1 5.2 4.2 -0.7 -31.0 
Tanzania  -0.1 8.6 12.0 -0.4 -28.0 
Uganda  0.0 2.0 2.3 0.4 -8.4 
Zambia  -0.2 9.8 5.6 0.4 -43.3 
Madagascar 0.0 1.4 2.7 -0.9 -2.7 
Senegal -0.1 4.5 8.5 -1.4 -20.1 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 0.2 10.9 2.6 1.6 -1772.1 
Botswana  0.3 3.6 1.7 1.6 9.7 
Mauritius  0.2 27.1 3.8 17.4 -71.2 
Zimbabwe  0.3 40.8 8.6 10.0 -388.0 
Rest of Southern Africa 1.0 12.6 9.1 -1.7 -343.3 
Nigeria -0.7 8.5 4.3 -0.7 -655.2 
Rest of SSA 0.0 9.5 9.4 -0.7 -1018.6 
Caribbean  0.0 6.0 3.9 -0.3 -471.4 
Pacific 0.5 24.2 8.7 -0.1 -778.0 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
Note TOT= Terms of Trade; BOT = Balance of Trade  
 
 
All the ACP countries experience increases in import volumes after FTA. Among the African 
ACP countries Zimbabwe experiences the largest rise in volume of imports (by 40.8 percent), 
followed by Mauritius (27 percent). The Pacific region experiences import volume increase 
by 24 percent, while for the Caribbean region the corresponding figure is 6 percent.  
 
All the ACP regions register increases in volume of exports. Among the African ACP 
countries, Tanzania has the highest percent increase (12 percent). The Pacific and the 
Caribbean region experience increase in exports by 8.7 and 3.9 percents respectively. 
 
Apart from Mauritius, Zimbabwe, South Africa and the rest of South African Customs, 
Botswana, Uganda and Zambia, all other ACP countries/regions listed in table 12 suffer from 
deterioration in their terms of trade. Also, balance of trade situation deteriorate for all ACP 
countries (except Botswana) under consideration. The largest fall in the balance of trade is for 
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South Africa and Rest of South African Customs (US$1772 million) followed by the Rest of 
SSA (US$ 1018 million US$). 
   
Table 7 provides the figures of the possible preference erosion of the ACP LDCs’ in terms of 
losing their export market in the EU because of full FTA under EPA. It appears that all the 7 
ACP LDCs suffer from preference erosion on most of the commodities they export to the EU 
market. However, some LDCs have been able to increase their exports of agro-processing 
products to EU because of FTA, as EU do not provide any duty-free market access on the 
agro-processing products.  
 
Table 7: Preference Erosion of the ACP LDCs in the EU: Changes in Exports from ACP LDCs to EU 
(Million US$) 
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Cereal -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Vegetables -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -1.3 -0.4 -1.1 
Oil seeds -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3
Sugar 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cotton -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Other crops -55.6 -0.5 -4.0 -6.6 -6.0 -0.2 -0.5
Livestock -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 
Nat resources -1.4 -0.3 1.0 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 4.5 
Agro processing 82.1 -4.0 32.4 -0.1 138.9 3.3 26.0 
Textile -0.3 0.0 -1.0 -0.3 -1.8 3.4 -0.9 
Wearing apparels -0.2 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -3.0 -0.2 
Light manufacturing -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -3.1 
Industry -3.6 -1.6 30.1 1.4 -40.6 1.9 -8.7 
Services -4.5 -0.3 -1.4 -1.1 -0.5 -0.2 10.9 
Trade -3.3 -0.3 -3.2 1.7 -0.7 -0.1 6.8 
Note: Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Madagascar and Senegal are the LDCs  
 
 
6.2. Comparing the Results of Simulations 1, 2, 3 and 4 
  
Simulation 2 and 3 entail tariff liberalisation between the EU and the ACP countries, not 
among the ACP countries. Simulation 4 is about the GSP option. Table 8 compares the 
welfare results of the second, third and fourth simulations with those of simulation one. The 
welfare effects of simulation 2 and 3 are very similar to those under simulation 1, though the 
extents of welfare losses are smaller in magnitudes. It also appears that moving from 
simulation 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3 the magnitudes of the welfare losses become smaller. 
Simulation 4 generates some very interesting results. All the 7 ACP LDCs and the rest of 
SSA gain because of increased preferences in the EU market. On the other hand, the ACP 
non-LDCs suffer from some welfare losses due to the preference erosion as a result of the 
increased tariffs in the EU.       
 
Table 8: Comparison of Welfare Effects of four Simulations (EV in Million US$) 
 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim 4 
EU 2325.5 1681.4 738.6 -213.2 
Malawi  -5.7 -4.4 -3.3 21.3 
Mozambique  -8.8 -5.1 -4.2 23.4 
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Tanzania  -35.7 -20.7 -5.6 33.6 
Uganda  -1.7 -1.1 -0.8 51.7 
Zambia  -2.5 -1.8 -1.3 30.9 
Madagascar -11.9 -9.3 -7.3 26.9 
Senegal -54.5 -63.5 -40.1 39.4 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 863.9 487.0 571.7 -43.2 
Botswana  68.4 71.7 65.9 -9.2 
Mauritius  563.9 575.0 578.2 -33.7 
Zimbabwe  254.7 242.5 247.6 -3.2 
Rest of Southern Africa 33.9 11.4 28.1 -1.1 
Nigeria -461.5 -232.0 -86.8 7.6 
Rest of SSA -821.8 -417.2 -138.4 19.8 
Caribbean  -47.4 -85.7 -64.1 23.5 
Pacific -79.9 -74.9 -44.3 17.2 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
 
A comparison of the four simulations with respect to the impact on real GDP is presented in 
Table 9. It also appears that simulation 2 and 3 generates better impacts on real GDP than in 
simulation 1. Simulation 4, on the other hand, results in no change in real GDP for most of 
the ACP countries. However, few ACP non-LDCs suffer from some negative changes in their 
real GDP.   
 
Table 9: Real GDP (% change from the base run) 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim 4 
Malawi  -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Mozambique  -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Tanzania  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Uganda  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Zambia  -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Madagascar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Senegal -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.1 
Botswana  0.3 0.5 0.7 -0.1 
Mauritius  0.2 0.2 1.6 0.0 
Zimbabwe  0.3 0.4 0.3 -0.1 
Rest of Southern Africa 1.0 1.2 1.4 -0.2 
Nigeria -0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Rest of SSA 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Caribbean  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Pacific 0.5 0.0 1.7 0.0 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
 
Table 10 suggests that among the four simulations the highest increase in imports, in general, 
occurred under simulation 1. As ACP countries, opt for less liberalisation of their tariffs 
under simulation 2 and 3, they experience lesser increase in imports compared to the FTA 
scenario under simulation 1. Under simulation 4, the impact on import growth is rather low 
for most of the ACP countries.     
 
Table 10: Imports (% change from the base run) 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim 4 
Malawi  9.5 7.5 6.7 0.2 
Mozambique  5.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1 
Tanzania  8.6 2.8 1.9 -0.1 
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Uganda  2.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Zambia  9.8 1.3 0.6 0.3 
Madagascar 1.4 0.3 -0.3 1.2 
Senegal 4.5 0.9 0.4 0.6 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 10.9 6.1 5.0 2.3 
Botswana  3.6 2.5 2.0 1.1 
Mauritius  27.1 23.2 20.9 3.6 
Zimbabwe  40.8 25.0 23.4 2.9 
Rest of Southern Africa 12.6 6.3 3.6 1.7 
Nigeria 8.5 4.8 2.8 1.9 
Rest of SSA 9.5 4.7 3.1 0.3 
Caribbean  6.0 4.6 3.8 0.0 
Pacific 24.2 20.5 19.1 0.4 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
 
Table 11 suggests that the export performances of the ACP countries are better under the full 
FTA scenario. Under simulation 4 the ACP LDCs, rest of SSA, Caribbean and the Pacific 
countries manage to increase their exports while the ACP non-LDCs suffer from negative 
growth. Table 12 indicates that the terms of trade position of the ACP countries improve as 
we move from simulation 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3. By gaining preferences in the EU market 
under simulation 4 the ACP LDCs, rest of the SSA, Caribbean and the Pacific countries 
experience favourable terms of trade effect, while most of the ACP non-LDCs face 
unfavourable terms of trade effect.   
 
Table 11: Exports (% change from the base run) 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim 4 
Malawi  4.7 3.7 3.3 3.8 
Mozambique  4.2 0.2 -0.1 3.3 
Tanzania  12.0 4.0 2.3 6.2 
Uganda  2.3 1.1 0.6 1.5 
Zambia  5.6 0.1 -0.3 3.9 
Madagascar 2.7 1.3 0.4 1.8 
Senegal 8.5 5.5 3.4 4.3 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 2.6 1.3 0.7 -2.3 
Botswana  1.7 0.6 0.5 -1.9 
Mauritius  3.8 2.0 0.9 -2.9 
Zimbabwe  8.6 2.0 1.0 -5.2 
Rest of Southern Africa 9.1 4.5 2.5 -5.9 
Nigeria 4.3 2.5 1.4 -1.7 
Rest of SSA 9.4 5.0 3.0 6.2 
Caribbean  3.9 2.7 1.8 1.5 
Pacific 8.7 4.9 3.0 2.6 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
 
Table 12: Terms of Trade (% change from the base run) 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim 4 
Malawi  -0.8 -0.1 0.0 0.5 
Mozambique  -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 1.2 
Tanzania  -0.4 -0.3 0.0 1.1 
Uganda  0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.9 
Zambia  0.4 0.9 0.9 1.3 
Madagascar -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 1.5 
Senegal -1.4 -2.1 -1.4 0.8 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 1.6 0.7 1.0 -0.5 
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Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
 
Table 13 suggests that the balance of trade improves under simulation 2 and 3 compared to 
those in simulation 1. There has been no significant impact on the balance of trade of the 
ACP countries under simulation 4.     
 
 
Table 13: Change in the Balance of Trade (Million US$) 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim 4 
Malawi  -143.1 -117.1 -115.1 -2.1 
Mozambique  -31.0 -6.5 -3.8 -1.3 
Tanzania  -28.0 -9.6 -8.4 0.2 
Uganda  -8.4 4.6 2.5 0.7 
Zambia  -43.3 -2.2 1.7 1.3 
Madagascar -2.7 -1.0 0.0 -1.8 
Senegal -20.1 18.2 13.4 0.9 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs -1772.1 -1121.0 -907.2 -20.5 
Botswana  9.7 11.9 15.5 -2.3 
Mauritius  -71.2 -21.7 10.2 -1.2 
Zimbabwe  -388.0 -289.4 -279.8 -0.5 
Rest of Southern Africa -343.3 -170.6 -99.9 0.9 
Nigeria -655.2 -383.4 -219.8 0.6 
Rest of SSA -1018.6 -490.4 -357.0 -11.9 
Caribbean  -471.4 -358.0 -288.5 -0.9 
Pacific -778.0 -709.7 -697.5 -0.3 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
 
 
6.3. Changes in the Sources of Imports and the Possibility of Trade Diversion 
 
Looking at the figures in Table 14 it appears that the imports from the EU to the ACP 
countries increase considerably due to the FTA (simulation 1).4 In fact, EU becomes the 
dominant source of imports for most of the ACP countries. The share of the ROW decreases 
for almost all ACP countries. Almost similar pattern, though in lesser magnitudes, holds for 
simulation 2 and 3. This is likely to generate important trade diversion effects for most of the 
ACP countries. Simulation 4 does not have any impact on the structure of the sources of 
imports. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The sources of imports from disaggerated ACP countries under simulation 1 are reported in Annex 2. 
Botswana  1.6 2.3 2.2 -1.3 
Mauritius  17.4 17.8 18.1 -3.2 
Zimbabwe  10.0 10.8 10.9 -2.3 
Rest of Southern Africa -1.7 -0.8 -0.5 -0.2 
Nigeria -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 
Rest of SSA -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 1.3 
Caribbean  -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 
Pacific -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.3 
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Table 14: Sources of Imports in the Base year and under different Simulations 
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EU 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.17 0.43 0.49 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.22 0.33 
ACP 0.54 0.46 0.12 0.21 0.56 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.70 0.11 0.56 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 
ROW 0.31 0.30 0.56 0.47 0.28 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.15 0.53 0.28 0.50 0.55 0.47 0.74 0.65 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                                   
S
i
m
 
1
 
EU 0.16 0.24 0.35 0.33 0.18 0.48 0.58 0.45 0.20 0.50 0.19 0.49 0.57 0.53 0.28 0.43 
ACP 0.61 0.50 0.20 0.22 0.60 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.63 0.11 0.59 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.03 
ROW 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.22 0.39 0.31 0.39 0.15 0.38 0.20 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.67 0.51 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                                   
S
i
m
 
2
 
EU 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.21 0.47 0.56 0.43 0.18 0.48 0.24 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.26 0.41 
ACP 0.49 0.42 0.11 0.19 0.52 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.66 0.09 0.50 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.01 
ROW 0.31 0.29 0.50 0.45 0.27 0.40 0.33 0.41 0.15 0.42 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.70 0.57 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                                   
S
i
m
 
3
 
EU 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.46 0.54 0.41 0.17 0.44 0.22 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.24 0.37 
ACP 0.50 0.43 0.11 0.20 0.53 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.67 0.10 0.51 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.01 
ROW 0.32 0.29 0.53 0.46 0.28 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.15 0.45 0.27 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.72 0.60 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                  
S
i
m
 
4
 
EU 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.17 0.43 0.49 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.33 
ACP 0.55 0.46 0.12 0.22 0.56 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.69 0.11 0.56 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 
ROW 0.31 0.30 0.56 0.47 0.27 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.16 0.53 0.28 0.50 0.55 0.47 0.75 0.65 
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
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6.4. Decomposing the Welfare Effects into Trade Creation and Trade Diversion  
 
It should, however, be noted that the original GTAP framework does not provide any estimates 
of trade creation and trade diversion aspects of the total welfare effects. In order to estimate these 
two effects we have made some adjustments in the GTAP model. The GTAP model provides a 
net welfare estimate of the simulation which is a sum of trade creation and trade diversion. With 
a view to separate the trade creation effect from the total welfare effect a separate simulation is 
run where we make necessary adjustments in the GTAP closure so that the imports to all the 
ACP countries from all over the world (except from the EU) are held fixed. The welfare effects 
from this scenario are nothing but the trade creation effects for individual ACP countries. This 
trade creation effect is then deducted from the welfare effect in the original simulation to get the 
estimate of the trade diversion effect. The results of this exercise for simulation 1 are presented 
in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects of Simulation 1 (Million US$) 
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Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results 
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It appears from Figure 7 that a large number ACP country will suffer from trade diversion if full 
FTA takes place between EU and the ACP countries. The largest trade diversion is for the rest of 
SSA (886.1 Million US$) followed by Nigeria (507.6 Million US$). On the other hand, the 
largest trade creation effect is for South Africa and the rest of South African Customs (924.6 
Million US$) followed by Mauritius (646.6 Million US$)   
 
 
6.5. Revenue Loss 
 
As have been mentioned in the introductory sections of this paper that there are serious concerns 
about the possibility of revenue loss because tariff liberalisation under EPA. We made an 
investigation, using the results from the GTAP exercises, to the extent of revenue losses for the 
ACP countries under four simulations. It appears from Table 15 that under full FTA (simulation 
1), there is a mixed result. Some countries suffer from revenue loss (i.e., Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, Rest of SSA, Caribbean and the Pacific), whereas some 
experience increase in government revenue (i.e, Zambia, Madagascar, South Africa, Botswana, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Rest of Southern Africa). The largest revenue loss is incurred by 
Nigeria by 431.8 million US$ (the explanation has been provided in box 2 of this paper). On the 
other hand, the largest revenue gain is by Mauritius (35.1 million US$). In general, the loss in 
revenue is the highest under simulation 1 among all four simulations, as far as the ACP countries 
altogether is concerned. Simulation 4 does not have any significant impacts on the changes in the 
import revenues for the ACP countries.      
 
Table 15: Change in Import Revenue (US$ million) 
 Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 
Malawi  -0.8 -0.5 0.2 0.0 
Mozambique  -4.6 -2.2 -0.9 0.1 
Tanzania  -13.4 -4.3 -0.1 0.3 
Uganda  -2.3 -1.2 -0.5 0.1 
Zambia  0.6 2.4 3.3 -0.2 
Madagascar 0.9 1.5 1.7 0.0 
Senegal -7.4 -2.6 -0.1 -0.1 
South Africa and Rest of South African Customs 33.5 81.2 101.2 -1.2 
Botswana  1.4 1.8 1.6 -2.3 
Mauritius  35.1 51.7 59.1 -0.2 
Zimbabwe  27.2 37.7 42.7 1.1 
Rest of Southern Africa 25.5 54.8 53.5 0.0 
Nigeria -431.8 -221.1 -85.7 -0.3 
Rest of SSA -179.7 -34.5 44.9 0.0 
Caribbean  -22.43 -18.4 -13.7 1.0 
Pacific -15.17 -11.1 -9.9 0.6 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on simulation results. 
 
 
VII. Policy Implications 
 
The analysis of the results of different simulation exercises reported in section VI lead a number 
of policy implications on EPAs. It appears that mere FTA between the EU and the ACP 
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countries, as envisaged by the EPA negotiations, is not welfare enhancing for a number of ACP 
countries. Therefore, a number of issues need to be considered while designing an effective EPA 
between the EU and the ACP countries. These are discussed below.   
  
 
7.1. The issue of development dimension in the EPA 
 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are supposed to bring in significant trade and 
development shifts for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries through symmetric 
trading arrangements among asymmetric economies. Especially for the LDCs and to some 
extent, for the developing countries of the region, there leaves room for weighting the benefits of 
EPA against the existing trading agreements. However, it appears from our analyses that a 
number of ACP countries may suffer from welfare losses due to EPA. To reap the benefits, 
countries with difficulties may, therefore, require support measures and there can be an 
adjustment lag. Therefore, EPAs to be effectively development conducive need to incorporate a 
broader development agenda rather than being part of simple trade negotiations. 
 
Initially the negotiations regarding EPAs were to concentrate only on trade matters leaving 
development adjustments and domestic reforms along with political dialogue arrangements under 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). With negotiation progress, development assistance in 
terms of Aid for Trade (AfT) has been incorporated to extend the umbrella of EPA though others 
are still beyond EPA considerations. In recent times almost all EU Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) (with non-ACP countries) cover development dimensions whereas for the African, Latin 
American and Asian countries, the agreements are split over multiple regional arrangements. 
There arises a confusion regarding whether to include non-trade development agenda for EU-
ACP within EPA or the regional ACP-EU partnership arrangements in this dimension will 
remain as it is even after the expiry of CPA in 2020.  
 
In this line, considerations regarding some of the conditionalities are crucial. First of all, the far 
reaching domestic reforms are subject to the strong political will and commitment of the ACP 
countries. Even if there is the will, there should be the expertise for designing and 
implementation of the comprehensive development agenda. And finally, the involvement, 
response and support from EU are necessary for effective initiatives against the capacity 
constraints.  
 
 
7.2. Alternatives to EPAs? 
 
The trade negotiation arrangements of EPA, specially the full reciprocal trade liberalisation 
provision, should be under scrutiny for the possible asymmetric implications over partner 
countries. Findings from our general equilibrium analyses reveal that a full reciprocal trade 
liberalisation will result in increased EU trade with major industrial shifts for ACP countries and 
further reduction in the already insignificant intra-ACP trade. To be more specific, ACP 
exporters already enjoy duty free market access in EU under Generalized System of Preference 
(GSP) and Everything But Arms (EBA) provisions and therefore, EPA agreements are supposed 
to exert positive impacts over EU exports to ACP countries, not the reverse. On the other hand, 
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shift of incentives will result in a structural adjustment of the ACP economies and therefore, 
unemployment and social difficulties will be the immediate adverse effects.  
 
Considerations, therefore, regarding alternative EPAs or alternatives to EPAs are gaining 
importance to ensure compatibility with development promises of EPAs. Our research shows 
that even if 50 percent reciprocation has been done under EPA, losses of a number of the ACP 
countries would come out to be significant. As an alternative to EPA, the GSP option seems to 
be welfare enhancing. However, if EU imposes stringent rules for the countries that are not 
joining EPA, the impacts will be changed. Thus, the seemingly attractive alternatives to EPA 
need to be assessed carefully. 
 
 
7.3. Argument for increased investment flows into the ACP countries 
 
In order to mitigate the negative effects of EPAs there can be a case for increased flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the ACP countries. Besides the access to investable capital, 
FDI is supposed to provide a country with advanced technological know-how and promote 
international and regional integration. A significant portion of the overall capital formation of the 
ACP countries is in the form of FDI, though the amount is insignificant compared to the world 
total in absolute terms, and most of the FDI comes from EU, the main development partner of 
ACP countries. Nevertheless, FDI to a country depends on several incentives and the level of 
economic and infrastructure stability. There are, however, concerns regarding the contribution of 
EPAs in attracting increased flows of FDI in the ACP countries.  
 
The national policies of most of the ACP countries provide a number of incentives to the foreign 
investors. Especially the new FDI legislations have liberalized the regime to a large extent. For 
instance, foreign ownership and control even in the case of land and real estate ownership has 
been liberalized, capital and profit repatriation provisions has been introduced, liberalisation of 
foreign exchange regime without any control of the central bank in some of the countries, 
liberalisation and privatization programs have been initiated allowing the participation of foreign 
firms and generous tax incentives have been implemented. Some of the ACP countries still have 
some set investment criteria, whereas others are more liberal. There are export incentives, free 
trade zones, bilateral investment treaties and provision for avoidance of double taxation, all of 
which work for FDI inflows to the ACP countries.  
 
For EPAs to effectively incorporate FDI policy, the negotiation should aim at utilization of 
technology transfer and capacity building of the ACP countries. In addition to export and 
investment promotion initiatives, export finance and other financial incentives, infrastructure 
projects and technical assistance and expertise capacity building are of special importance. 
Negotiation regarding tax incentives from EU, as there exist provisions from USA if invested in 
developing countries, should be included under the broader framework of EPA.   
 
 
7.4. Can mode 4 - type of arrangement be considered to increase welfare? 
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Services trade liberalisation has been estimated to be welfare enhancing for the developing 
countries and the LDCs especially as a result of both liberalisation of the own market and the 
increased market access abroad. Results from global general equilibrium models suggest that the 
gains from services liberalisation are higher than that from goods trade liberalisation and have a 
more equal distribution over the countries. Services trade liberalisation increases economic 
efficiency through enhancing both allocative and dynamic efficiency in the sense that with 
regulatory changes in favour of foreign firms with advanced technology, production cost reduces 
and removal of barriers work for increased competition. Also, the developing and the least 
developed countries are likely to acquire significant welfare gains if they are allowed enhanced 
market accesses in the developed countries for the services categories of their export interest.  
 
Though no differentiation has been done in estimating welfare impacts of services trade 
liberalisation in terms of four modes of services trade, liberalisation under mode 4 is by 
definition comparatively advantageous for labour-intensive industries and therefore for the LDCs 
and developing countries in the ACP region. Negotiations for FDI under EPA with respect to 
services trade under mode 3, and exporting low-skilled and semi-skilled labour (temporary 
movement of natural persons) from the ACP countries to the EU under the mode 4 negotiation 
will be more beneficial for the ACP countries considering their labour endowment and level of 
economic development. A study estimated that an increased developed country quota for both 
skilled and unskilled workers would increase global welfare by US$ 156 billion of which gain 
for Africa would be around US$ 14 billion (Winters, 2002).   
 
 
7.5. The prospect of increased intra-African trade 
 
As has been pointed out in the introductory section, concerns have been raised regarding the 
possible impacts of EPA on the currently existing regional integration schemes in Africa. There 
is a consensus among EU and the ACP countries that EPA should promote regional integration 
among the ACP countries. There have, however, been conflicting views on the impact of EPA on 
bolstering regional integration among the ACP countries – some studies have argued that EPA 
will lower regional trade, while some other studies have argued EPA to be beneficial to internal 
trade amongst the ACP countries. 
 
Our analysis suggests that full implementation of EPA, in general, did not lead to a reduction in 
trade among the ACP countries. However, less than full reciprocity scenarios (i.e., simulation 2 
and simulation 3), where ACP countries cut their tariffs only on EU imports not on the ACP 
countries’ imports, have negative implications for the regional integration among the ACP 
countries. Under both these two scenarios, the share of imports from the ACP countries decline 
for most of the ACP countries. However, under the GSP option scenario (simulation 4) there will 
be no significant impact on the structure of existing regional trade.  
 
 
7.6. Adjustment costs of EPAs 
 
With reciprocal trade liberalisation, imports from the EU to ACP countries are supposed to 
increase substantially with more opening of the later markets. Therefore, there will be a huge 
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loss of tariff revenue that the governments of the ACP countries need to substitute from non-
trade taxes. It, however, appears from our analysis that the revenue implication of EPA is not the 
same for all ACP countries. There are some large losers like Rest of SSA and Nigeria. Also, 
Pacific and the Caribbean suffer from revenue losses. Though a number of some other ACP 
countries suffer from loses, the magnitudes of loses are not that big. Also, some countries 
experience revenue gain.  
Trade liberalisation negotiations under EPAs are supposed to incorporate adjustment costs not 
only in the form of tariff revenue reduction, but also in the form of resource reallocation from the 
import-competing industries to the exporting industries, production and employment adjustment 
costs, skill development costs and finally, negotiations and legislative costs. Box 4 summarises 
various types of adjustment costs.  
 
 
Box 4: Adjustment costs of EPAs 
 
Fiscal adjustment costs: In order to replace any tariff revenue losses associated with the EPA an 
ACP country will need to either revise or reform the structure of taxation from non-trade tax 
sources in order to increase revenue from these alternative sources. 
 
Trade facilitation and export diversification costs: If the benefits of re-allocating resources (capital, 
labour, skills and land) away from import-competing towards new export activities (under the 
stimulus of greater competition on the home market from EU exporters) are to be reaped, actual 
and potential exporters in ACP countries will need support with developing export products and 
gaining knowledge about export market opportunities. 
 
Production and employment adjustment costs: The displacement of imports from the pre-EPA 
regional supplier by EU exports will tend to induce falls in production and employment in the 
partner ACP country.  However, where the home country has a production capability there will be 
similar displacement to production and employment in the import-competing sector by the growth 
EU exports to ACP countries.  Since the reallocation of displaced resources from current (pre-EPA) 
activities to export sectors will not be immediate and smooth, then the ACP countries will need 
assistance with the adjustment experienced by workers (compensation for unemployment, support 
for relocation and retraining) and by firms (closure, production line restructuring etc). 
 
Skills development and productivity enhancement costs: The costs of adjustment (contraction of 
import-substitution activities and expansion of export sectors) will be reduced over time and scope 
for dynamic benefits from export development will be increased over time by increasing 
productivity levels in ACP countries.  Increasing competitiveness and productivity levels in 
preparation for the full implementation of EPAs requires support; through the enhancement of 
workers’ skills, the improvement of firm’s organisation and management structures and through the 
development of supportive economic policies and infrastructures. 
 
Negotiation and legislative costs: In addition to the direct economic and financial costs that will 
fall on individuals, and on private and public sector organisations in ACP countries, the ACP 
countries will need to negotiate and implement EPAs.  Indeed some negotiation costs have already 
been incurred, but more negotiations are required.  Once the EPAs are agreed, there will be a need 
to implement the agreements through legislative reform, administrative change, public sector 
training and adjustment assistance programme support.  These will all involve additional public 
administrative costs in ACP countries. 
 
Source: Milner (2005) 
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The adjustment costs regarding the structural shift of the industries from import-competing to 
export oriented is a matter of special consideration. Going beyond the assumption of perfect 
labour mobility within industries of the traditional economic theories, the gains from trade 
liberalisation in the practical context become extremely limited for countries with structural 
rigidities. Moreover, the advanced theories of endogenous growth cannot guarantee that the 
country will specialise in activities that contribute to higher economic growth in the presence of 
market imperfections such as increasing returns to scale. Therefore, the adjustment costs or loss 
of efficiency due to liberalisation under EPA may come out to be of a significant amount for the 
ACP states. The amount further increases with the inclusion of production and employment 
adjustment costs, costs for provision for required training and capacity building, and legislative 
costs.  Considering the above dimensions Milner (2005) estimated the overall cost of EPA 
adjustment for the ACP countries as about €9.1 billion (at current prices).  This is relatively a 
large figure compared to the welfare gains due to liberalisation and thus provides support for 
negotiations for financial assistance.  
 
 
7.7. WTO negotiations on NAMA and Agricultural Liberalisation  
 
There are two major ongoing multilateral negotiations under WTO: the negotiations on NAMA 
where developed and developing countries will be cutting their MFN tariffs on non-agricultural 
commodities, and the negotiations on agricultural trade liberalisation where developed and the 
developing countries will be withdrawing subsidies and domestic support measures, and cutting 
tariffs on agricultural products. Concerns have, however, been raised regarding the possible 
impacts of such WTO negotiations on the regional free trade arrangements as envisaged under 
the EPA. For example, if EU reduces MFN tariff substantially on manufacturing and agricultural 
products, the benefits from free trade agreements will be withered for the ACP countries. 
However, the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies and domestic support measures on agriculture 
will raise the prices of the agricultural products in the world market, and the ACP countries, who 
are the net exporters of agricultural products, are likely to accrue further gains from such 
liberalisation process. 
 
 
VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper has evaluated the possible effects of the Economic Partnership Agreement using a 
global general equilibrium modelling framework, namely the GTAP model. The latest version of 
the GTAP database (version 6.22) has been employed as a benchmark database. The study has 
explored the implications of different EPA scenarios (in terms of changes in GDP, exports, and 
other measures for welfare) for ACP countries (both developing and LDCs), based on the sample 
of countries in the database. The major findings of the research are as follows: 
 
- Full FTA between EU and the ACP countries (simulation 1) will generate significant welfare 
losses for a number of ACP countries. Especially the ACP LDCs will suffer from preference 
erosion in the EU market. There are also significant trade diversion effects for many of the 
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ACP countries. Many ACP countries also suffer from negative terms of trade shock and 
decline in their real GDP. However, a few ACP non-LDCs stand to welfare gains. 
 
- Most of the ACP countries seem to be better off with the scenarios depicting less than full 
reciprocity (simulation 2 and 3) as these two scenarios lead to less welfare losses compared 
to those under full FTA scenario (simulation1). Although, these two scenarios result in 
unfavourable effects on terms of trade and on real GDP for many ACP countries, such effects 
are less prominent compared to those under full FTA scenario.  
 
- The GSP option (simulation 4) favours the ACP LDCs as it increases their preference 
margins in the EU market, but generates some negative welfare effects for the ACP non-
LDCs.  
 
The upshots of the aforementioned discussion point us to the fact that, in comparison to 
simulation 1 (the full FTA scenario), simulations 2 and 3 (the scenarios depicting less than full 
reciprocity) generate favourable outcomes for most of ACP countries in terms of the effects on 
their welfare, real GDP and terms of trade. These findings support the case of less than full 
reciprocity as opposed to full FTA under the EPA negotiations. Therefore, full FTA scenario 
under EPA may not be the best option for many ACP countries.  
 
At the end we can argue that several areas of the negotiations of trade liberalisation under EPAs 
demand careful consideration with respect to the development concerns of many of the ACP 
countries. As full reciprocity of tariff liberalisation may have negative welfare implications for 
many LDCs and developing countries in the ACP region, and as EPA has not been able to be 
envisaged as a better option than the existing GSP or EBA facilities, there is a need for further 
negotiations. There is no denying that incorporation of the development dimensions in the EPA 
negotiations, further promotion of intra-ACP trade, providing market access in the EU by 
liberalising the service sector in the categories which are of export interests of the ACP countries 
(especially mode 4 liberalisation), providing effective technical and financial assistance under 
the programme of ‘aid for trade’ to compensate the possible large adjustment costs and allowing 
a reasonably longer time span for the ACP countries for the full implementation of EPA should 
be considered with high priorities in order to subside the possible welfare reducing impacts of 
the ongoing EPA negotiations.  
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